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This paper proposes and analyzes an intergenerational model of domestic violence (IMDV) in
which behavioral strategies or scripts are transmitted from parents to children.
  The model rests upon three key assumptions:
* The probability that a husband will be violent depends on whether he grew up in a violent
home.
* The probability that a wife will remain with a violent husband depends on whether she grew
up in a violent home.
* Individuals who grew up in violent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in violent
homes.
The IMDV calls attention to three features neglected in the domestic violence literature.  The first
is the marriage market.  If some men are more likely than others to be violent as husbands and some
women are more likely than others to remain in violent marriages, then the probability that such
individuals marry each other is crucial.  The second neglected feature is divorce: ongoing domestic
violence requires the conjunction of a husband who is violent and a wife who stays.  Third, variables and
policies that reduce the rate of domestic violence in the short run are likely to reduce it even further in the
long run.
Robert A. Pollak
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Washington University in St. Louis
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An Intergenerational Model of Domestic Violence 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Domestic violence is a high-profile social problem, and its prevalence and causes have been 
extensively discussed in both the social science literature and the popular media. The economic, social, 
and psychological effects of domestic (i.e., marital or spousal) violence have also received considerable 
attention from researchers.
1  One focus of this attention has been the possible effects on children who 
witness violence within the family, including effects on their own tendency to perpetrate or experience 
domestic violence as adults.  The phrase “cycle of violence” is commonplace in the literature on spouse 
abuse, but there have been few attempts to model the intergenerational transmission of domestic 
violence.  This paper presents a simple model in which the prevalence of domestic violence in the long 
run depends upon both the intergenerational transmission of propensities for violence within families and 
on patterns of marriage and divorce.  Its intention is to provide a prototype of more complex models 
that might inform discussions of violence prevention and interventions, as well as to highlight potential 
problems in estimating the parameters of such models and calculating the prevalence and correlates of 
domestic violence. 
 
   The “violence begets violence” hypothesis has many variants, ranging from assertions that 
abused children are more likely to become abusers themselves to concerns that viewing television 
violence will increase aggressive behavior among children.  A principal strand in the cycle-of-violence 
literature examines the effects of witnessing violence between parents on the probability that children will 
experience violence in their own marriages, either as perpetrators or as victims.  Considerable evidence 
has accumulated that there is a statistical relationship between violence in the parents’ marriage and 
violence in the child’s, but the intergenerational transmission mechanism is not clear.  The level of marital 
violence will depend not only on how tendencies to commit and to tolerate violence are transmitted, but 
also on who marries whom, and on which marriages or relationships remain intact long enough to 
influence the behavior of children. 
 
                                                 
1 Although I phrase the discussion of domestic violence in terms of "marriage," the analysis also applies to 
cohabitation.  
  2  
  Marriage and divorce patterns are thus crucial elements of the intergenerational transmission 
process and of the equilibrium level of domestic violence.  The selection of partners and the dissolution 
of violent relationships will depend on individual characteristics that may be correlated with past 
experiences of violence and with individual propensities for violence.  The actual cycle of violence is 
therefore a complex phenomenon and designing effective interventions depends upon understanding the 
underlying transmission process.  To explain the process and to focus attention on important gaps in our 
empirical knowledge, I propose a model of the transmission of domestic violence that explicitly 
recognizes the roles of marriage formation and dissolution.  As in any dynamic model, the distinction 
between the short run and the long run is essential, but as in any intergenerational model, the long run 
can be very long. 
 
  The model's basic framework is one in which husbands may or may not be violent, and in which 
the wives of violent husbands may or may not divorce them.  The model assumes that men who are 
raised in violent homes are more likely to be violent as adults, and that women who witness domestic 
violence as children are more likely to remain with an abusive spouse.  I initially assume that children are 
affected by domestic violence only if their mothers fail to leave an abusive partner, then explore an 
alternative specification in which divorce is imperfectly protective. The transmission mechanism of the 
model is consistent with, but is not implied by, extensive evidence of a positive correlation between 
parental domestic violence and future involvement in an abusive relationship.  In section II I discuss the 
empirical evidence that informs the intergenerational transmission model.  A severe shortage of reliable 
evidence concerning the relationships among marriage, divorce, family background, and violence makes 
it difficult to assess alternative modeling strategies, but an explicit model helps identify data needs.  
 
  Section III provides an informal overview of the model, while section IV develops the simplest 
version of the model, a version with no divorce and random mating.  Section V adds divorce.  The 
addition of divorce focuses attention on the marriage market.  Because ongoing domestic violence 
depends upon the pairing of violent men with women who will stay with them, the prevalence of 
domestic violence depends on the marital matching process.  Section VI discusses assortative mating.  
In a version of a model that allows selective matching on the basis of family background characteristics 
associated with violence (i.e., women from violent homes are more likely to marry men from violent  
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homes) I show that the equilibrium level of violence increases with positive assortative mating.
2   Section 
VII is a brief conclusion.  
 
 
II.  The Economics of Domestic Violence 
 
Although the literature on domestic violence is vast, the literature within economics on this topic 
is scant.
3.  Several recent papers examine the effects of spousal abuse on economic outcomes such as 
women’s employment (Lloyd [1997], Bowlus and Seitz [2002]), or attempt to measure the overall cost 
to society of domestic violence (Greaves, Hankivsky, and Kingston-Riechers [1995]).  Estimates of this 
cost depend upon the prevalence of violent marriages, which has proven very difficult to measure. 
 
Domestic violence is believed to be underreported on surveys.  In addition, reported rates are 
sensitive both to the definition used and the way questions are posed.  In the U.S., the National Crime 
Victimization Survey yields estimates of annual rates violence by “intimates” that remained at about 6.5 
per thousand for women and 1.2-1.8 per thousand for men during the 1980s, but these rates jumped 
sharply in the early 1990s when the survey was revised.  Rates reported in the National Crime 
Victimization Survey are much lower than those implied by the National Family Violence Surveys of 
1975 and 1985, which asked about specific types of violent behavior between husbands and wives and 
did not require that the respondent identify this behavior as a “crime.”  Rates of “severe” husband-to-
wife violence of about 30 per thousand are implied by the responses to this survey, and reported rates 
of severe wife-to-husband violence are even higher.
4  A recent Canadian data source, the Violence 
Against Women Survey finds that 29 percent of ever-married women and 50 percent of divorced 
women have been the victims of spousal abuse. 
                                                 
2 One can make a priori arguments for negative rather than positive assortative mating and, for that matter, for 
negative rather than positive patterns of intergenerational transmission (e.g., arguing that those who grow up in 
violent homes realize how bad violence is and avoid it in choosing partners and in their own lives).  Although some 
individuals may react in this way, the empirical evidence (e.g., Kalmuss [1994]) suggests that the intergenerational 
correlations are positive.  Violence in the previous generation is a risk factor for violence. 
3 Yoshikawa and Rosman [2000] survey the domestic violence literature with an emphasis on recent work in 
psychology. 
 
4 Blau [1998, pp. 155-158] reports these rates and provides references for the U.S. surveys.  She concludes that there 
is no evidence of an upward trend in domestic violence in these surveys.  
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Most economists who have attempted to explain domestic violence rather than document its 
prevalence and effects have taken a game-theoretic approach.  Tauchen, Witte, and Long [1991] 
consider a noncooperative game in which violence has both expressive and instrumental components: 
violence increases the husband’s utility directly, and may also increase his utility indirectly through 
control of his wife’s behavior.  Their paper, the most serious sustained attempt to account for domestic 
violence within the framework of a bargaining model of marriage, specifies a two-stage game; whether 
there is violence in equilibrium depends on the level of resources controlled by each spouse and on 
whether the reservation utility constraint is binding (e.g., whether the wife is no better off remaining in the 
marriage than she would be if she left).  Farmer and Tiefenthaler [1997] present a noncooperative 
model of domestic violence that implies that wives’ income and other financial support available from 
outside the marriage will decrease the level of violence in intact families. 
 
In a game-theoretic context, violence or the threat of violence can be regarded as an aspect of 
the “threat point” in a cooperative bargaining model or as part of a “punishment strategy” in a non-
cooperative game.  This framework points to factors such as the wife’s employment status or potential 
earnings, or the attractiveness of her alternatives outside the marriage, as determinants of the incidence 
of marital violence.  Empirical studies of the wife’s economic dependence and its relationship to 
violence, most of which have been based on small non-representative samples, have produced 
somewhat mixed results.  However, Tauchen, Witte and Long find the expected negative relationship 
between violence and women’s income for low- and middle-income families in their sample.  Farmer 
and Tiefenthaler [1996] analyze the effectiveness of shelters and other services for battered women, and 
argue that the use of such services can be a signal of a women's unwillingness to tolerate domestic 
violence.  Tauchen and Witte [1995] examine the effectiveness of alternative police practices (i.e., 
advising the couple; separating them temporarily; arresting the suspected perpetrator) in response to 
domestic violence calls. An interesting paper by Bloch and Rao [2002] finds patterns of wife abuse in a 
sample from Southern India that appear to be related to inter-household transfers, and in which transfers 
appear to be driven by costs and benefits. 
 
Stevenson and Wolfers [2002] investigate the relationship between divorce law changes and 
domestic violence.  Using state level data, they find a statistically significant relationship between the  
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adoption of unilateral divorce and a decline in domestic violence.  They also find that the adoption of 
unilateral divorce is associated with a decline in female suicide rates and in the likelihood that women 
will be murdered by their partners. 
  
In this paper I ignore bargaining and rational choice in order to focus on an aspect of the 
empirical evidence concerning domestic violence that game-theoretic models have not addressed -- the 
intergenerational correlation of domestic violence.  Straus [1995] asserts: "The idea that child-abusing 
parents were themselves victims of abuse, and that wife-beating husbands come from violent families, is 
now widely accepted." (Straus [1995, p. 406]).
5  I leave the analysis of child abuse to a future paper; in 
this paper I consider only the intergenerational transmission of domestic violence. 
 
III.  An Overview of the Model 
 
  I propose and analyze an intergenerational model of domestic violence in which behavioral 
strategies or scripts are transmitted from parents to children: boys and girls learn the adult roles of 
husbands and wives from their fathers and mothers.
6  The substantial literature on epidemiology of family 
violence recognizes multiple pathways of transmission, from witnessing violence in the community to 
being a victim of family violence. The model assumes a particular transmission  
pathway--witnessing domestic violence in the family of origin—though modeling a transmission 
mechanism that allows genetic as well as environmental components is clearly desirable.
7  Marriages and 
divorces depend upon violence and propensities for violence in rather simple ways, but I do not model 
the optimizing behavior of individuals.   
 
                                                 
5 Using the survey data collected by Straus and Gelles, Kalmuss [1994] provides some badly needed quantification.  
She reports that both marital violence and parent-child violence in family of origin are related to domestic violence. 
“When neither form of aggression occurred in one's childhood family, the probability of (husband-
wife) aggression is 1%...  When only parent-child hitting occurred, the probability is increased to 
3%.... When only parental hitting, the probability doubles to 6%.  Finally, when both types of 
childhood aggression occurred, the probability of severe (husband-wife) aggression is 12%.” (p. 
15) 
6 The model is thus broadly consistent with models of "cultural transmission" such as those proposed by Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman [1981] and by Boyd and Richerson [1985], but the emphasis here is on intergenerational 
transmission within families and not on intragenerational transmission and peers. 
7 Wrangham and Peterson [1996] argue that the human male propensity for domestic violence has deep roots in the 
evolutionary history of our species, but their argument has no obvious implications for understanding differences in 
behavior across societies, changes in behavior within societies over time, or differences in the behavior of  
  6  
  The model rests upon three key assumptions: 
 
1.  The probability that a husband will be violent depends on whether he grew up in a violent home. 
2.  The probability that a wife will remain with a violent husband depends on whether she grew up in a 
violent home. 
3.  Individuals who grew up in violent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in violent homes; 
individuals who grew up in nonviolent homes tend to marry individuals who grew up in nonviolent 
homes. 
 
The assumption that marital violence is asymmetric, that the husband is the perpetrator and the wife the 
victim, is at odds with survey evidence that wives report as many acts of violence towards their 
husbands as by their husbands.
8  The usual assumption that men inflict most serious injuries is supported 
by the National Crime Victimization Survey, which reports much higher rates of violence towards 
women, and by relative rates of homicide by intimates.
9 
 
  Heterogeneity of both men and women is central to the model: some husbands are violent, 
others are not; some wives divorce violent husbands, others do not.  Each individual's behavior is 
random, but the probabilities are determined by the presence or absence of violence in the individual's 
family of origin. The intergenerational model of domestic violence (IMDV) relies on  
propensities and probabilities rather than on utility maximization and strategic behavior.  It thus follows 
the precedent of evolutionary, demographic, and epidemiological models rather than of rational choice 
models.
10  Avoiding the complications of rational choice, I focus on other complications.  A 
thoroughgoing rational choice version of the IMDV would require allowing individuals to make choices 
regarding marriage, fertility, violence, and divorce.  Like the IMDV, however, any satisfactory model of 




                                                                                                                                                             
individuals within a society. 
8  Straus and Gelles [1986]; Straus [1997]. 
9  Bachman and Saltzman [1995]. 
10 Unlike evolutionary games in which fitness is density dependent, I assume that survival probabilities and 
reproductive success are independent of the composition of the population and identical for all individuals. 
11 On the transmission of preferences, see Pollak [1976], Becker [1992], Pollak and Watkins [1993], and Becker [1996].  
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  The basic structure of the IMDV can be described with the use of a time line.  We begin in 
period t with an initial vector showing the number of men and the number of women of each type in the 
population where types are defined in terms of sex and home environment (violent/nonviolent). The 
model specifies a sequence of five stages that defines a mapping of the population by type in period t 
into the population by type in period t+1:  
  (1) marriages 
  (2) births 
  (3) signals indicating whether the husband will be violent  
  (4) divorce/nondivorce 
  (5) violence/nonviolence. 
 
  Time Line  
   
  marriages            births             signals                divorce          violence        marriages 
-------------------œ------------------œ-------------------œ-----------------------œ-----------------œ---
------------ 
Period t                    Period t+1 
 
This sequence reflects two simplifying assumptions.  First, realized violence affects neither marriage nor 
fertility.  If signals regarding propensities for violence are broadcast during courtship (e.g., if violence in 
the families of origin of potential spouses are observable), we might expect both assortative mating and 
systematic differences in marriage and fertility rates between different types of individuals.  The timing 
assumptions of the model preclude this: realized violence occurs too late to affect marriage or fertility.  
Second, I begin with the assumption that divorce occurs, if at all, before violence has occurred (e.g., 
because divorce is triggered by the signal that violence will occur rather than by the occurrence of 
violence).  This assumption implies that divorce is "fully protective" because divorce prevents children 
from witnessing domestic violence.  I then examine the consequences of relaxing the assumption that 
divorce is fully protective of children. 
 
IV.  The Simplest IMDV:  No Divorce and Random Mating 
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  I begin with notation to characterize the population distribution in period t: 
 
p Ft =  the fraction of women who grew up in violent homes in period t 
p Mt =  the fraction of men who grew up in violent homes in period t 
 
  I assume that propensities for violence depend upon the type of home (violent or nonviolent) in 
which the husband grew up:  
 
pv=  the probability that a man will be violent if he grew up in a violent home 
pv=  the probability that a man will be violent if he grew up in a nonviolent home 
 
These probabilities are crucial parameters of the IMDV.  Not surprisingly, the equilibrium level of 
violence is increasing in both p parameters.  I assume p p v v £ .  Intergenerational transmission of a 
propensity toward violence corresponds to the strict inequality (i.e., p p v v < ), but the polar case in 
which  p p v v =  provides a benchmark. 
 
  The simplest version of the IMDV assumes that mating is random with respect to the family 
background (violent/nonviolent) of men and women, and that marriages cannot be dissolved.  I begin by 
calculating the fraction of violent homes in period t+1, assuming random mating and no divorce: 
 
  (1a)  p p p p p p p p p t v Ft Mt v Ft Mt v Ft Mt v Ft Mt p p p p + = + - + - + - - 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )( )  
 
Since p p p Ft Mt t = = , (1a) reduces to 
 
  (1b)  p p p t v t v t p p + = + - 1 1 ( ) 
 
and we can rewrite (1b) as  
 
  (1c)  p p t v v v t p p p + = + - 1 ( ) . 
  
  9  
  In a steady state, p p p = = + t t 1, so that (1b) implies 
 
  (2a)   p p p = + - p p v v( ) 1 . 
 
  We can investigate the existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics properties of the long-run 
equilibrium by solving (2a) for p as a function of  pv and pv 
 
  (3)  p = - - p p p v v v [ ( )] 1 . 
 
  Clearly, this simple version of the IMDV has a unique long-run equilibrium.  Furthermore, it is 
straightforward to show from equation (3) that the equilibrium value of p is an increasing function of  pv 
and of pv.  Equation (2) implies that p is a weighted average of pv and pv and, hence, 
 
   p p v v £ £ p . 
 
As pv increases from 0 to pv, the equilibrium value of p increases from 0 to pv.  As pv increases from 
pv to 1, the equilibrium value of p increases from pv to 1.  
  In versions of the IMDV with divorce and assortative mating, I use a different approach to 
investigate existence, uniqueness, and comparative statics.  In those versions of the IMDV, the 
equations analogous to (2a) are nonlinear and I rely on the implicit function theorem rather than explicitly 
solving for the equilibrium value of p.  With no divorce and random mating, the analogue of the implicit 
function approach rearranges (2a) by moving p to the right-hand side, defines a function G(p) by   
  (2b)  p p p p - - + = ) 1 ( ) ( v v p p G   
and observes that the equilibrium level of p is implicitly defined by the equation  
  (2c)  0 *) ( = p G . 
 
  Differences between the long-run and short-run effects of a change in the parameters on the 
level of violence can be easily seen in this simple model.  For example, an increase in the probability that 
a man from a violent home will be violent will have a smaller impact on the rate of violence in the next  
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period (differentiate (1b) with respect to pv), than it will have on the equilibrium level of violence (from 
(3)). 
  The dynamics are also straightforward.  Equation (1c) is the familiar nonhomogeneous linear 
difference equation
12 whose solution is  
 




















As t increases, ( ) p p v v
t -  approaches 0 and p t converges to the equilibrium (3). 
 
  Three degenerate cases provide benchmarks: 
 
Case 1.  If  p p v v = , then p = = p p v v.  That is, if the probability that a man will be violent is the same 
regardless of whether he comes from a violent or a nonviolent home, then the equilibrium is equal to this 
common probability. 
 
Case 2. If  pv =1 and pv „ 0, then p =1.  That is, if all men from violent homes are violent and some 
men from nonviolent homes are violent then in equilibrium all men are violent. 
 
Case 3. If  pv = 0 and pv „1, then p =0 .  That is, if men from nonviolent homes are never violent and 
not all men from violent homes are violent, then in equilibrium violence disappears.
13 
 
  A diagram illustrates the long-run equilibria corresponding to various parameter combinations.  
We plot pv on the x-axis and pv on the y-axis; points below the 45￿ ray correspond to parameter 
combinations satisfying the condition that pv < pv.  The equilibrium level of violence is constant along 
the plotted curves, each of which is a straight line radiating from the point (pv,pv) = (1, 0).  The level of 
violence corresponding to each curve can be inferred from the values of  pv and pv corresponding to the 
                                                 
12  See Luenberger [1979, pp. 19-22]. 
13  If  pv =1 and pv = 0, then equation (1c) implies a neutral equilibrium in which  10 tt ppp + == regardless of the 
initial value of  0 p .  
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intersection of the curve with the 45￿ ray from the origin; along the 45￿ ray, pv = pv and the equilibrium 
value of p is equal to their common value.
14 
 
Figure 1 goes about here 
 
V.  Divorce 
   
I next add divorce to the simplest model by assuming that women who grew up in nonviolent 
homes are less likely to stay with violent husbands than are women from violent homes.  Allowing 
divorce to depend on family background makes the model much more complex by requiring two 
additional parameters and destroying linearity.  In certain degenerate cases, however, the model with 
divorce becomes as transparent as the model without divorce.  I begin by assuming that divorce is “fully 
protective” in the sense that children who grow up in single parent families have the same propensities to 
violence and to divorce as children who grow up in nonviolent two parent families. 
 
  Notation for staying with a violence husband is more convenient that notation for leaving: 
 
sv =  the probability that a women will stay married to a violent husband if she grew up in a violent 
home, and 
sv =  the probability that a woman will stay married to a violent husband if she grew up in a nonviolent 
home. 
   
  I assume s s v v £ .  An intergenerational transmission of a propensity for women to stay with 
violent husbands corresponds to the strict inequality (i.e., s s v v < ), but the polar case in which s s v v =  
provides a benchmark.
15  With the introduction of divorce, the probability that a man has a propensity 
to be violent and the probability that an observed marriage will be violent are no longer equal.  Empirical 
studies of domestic violence and its effects must recognize that this selectivity implies that observed 
violent marriages constitute a population that differs systematically in terms of other characteristics as 
                                                 
14 I am grateful to Helen Tauchen for suggesting this figure. 
15 I do not introduce notation for the probabilities that women from each type of home will stay married to nonviolent 
husbands, because these probabilities play no role in the analysis.   
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  We now need to distinguish among four types of marriages, depending on the type of home in 
which the husband grew up and the type of home in which the wife grew up.  For each type, we have a 
probability that the husband will be violent and, for each type, a probability that the wife will stay 
married if her husband is violent.  Hence, given the fraction of violent homes in period t, we can 
calculate the fraction of violent homes in period t+1: 
 
  (5a)  p p p p p p p p p t v v Ft Mt v v Ft Mt v v Ft Mt v v Ft Mt s p s p s p s p + = + - + - + - - 1 1 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )( )   
 
Recognizing that  p p p Ft Mt t = = , (5a) can be rewritten as 
 
  (5b)  p p p p p p p t v v t v v t t v v t t v v t s p s p s p s p + = + - + - + - 1
2 2 1 1 1 ( ) ( ) ( )    
   
Moving p t+1 to the right hand side of (5b) and rewriting it in terms of the equilibrium value of p, the 
equilibrium condition becomes  
 
  (6)  G s p s p s p s p v v v v v v v v ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) p p p p p p p p = + - + - + - - =
2 2 1 1 1 0  
 
Equation (5b) implies that p t+1 is a weighted average of the four factors { , , , } s p s p s p s p v v v v v v v v .  Under 
our assumptions, this implies 
 
      s p s p v v t v v £ £ + p 1 . 
   
  The existence of an equilibrium value of p -- that is, a value p
*
, 0 1 £ £ p
*
, for which 
G( )
* p = 0--follows immediately from the continuity of the function G() ￿ , the intermediate value 
theorem, and the observations that  
                                                 
16  Bowlus and Seitz [2002] find that domestic violence plays an important role in the divorce decision:  the divorce 
rate of women in the Canadian Violence Against Women Survey who were not abused was 15%, while the divorce  
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  G s p v v ( ) 0 0 = > ,    and  
 
  G s p v v ( ) 1 1 0 = - < . 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the argument for existence and the argument for uniqueness (below).
17 
  
  To establish uniqueness, we appeal to the fact that the function G(.) is quadratic.  This fact, in 
conjunction with G(0) > 0 and G(1) < 0, implies that the function G(.) has exactly one 0 in the interval 
[0,1].  This argument also implies that G(.) is downward sloping at the equilibrium, p
*
.  (The argument 
does not imply that the function G(.) is monotonically decreasing on the interval [0,1]; the conclusion 
we require is that G(.) crosses the x-axis exactly once on the interval [0,1] and is downward sloping 
when it crosses the axis.) 
   
Figure 2 goes about here 
 
The quadratic formula, which I present in the Appendix, yields an opaque expression for the equilibrium 
value of p in terms of the four parameters { , , , } p p s s v v v v .
18  The model with divorce becomes 
transparent in three special cases. 
   
Case 1. Suppose s s s v v = = , so the probability that a wife will stay married to a violent husband is 
independent of whether she grew up in a violent or a nonviolent home.  In this case, because pv and pv 
are always multiplied by the common value of s and because s appears nowhere else, we can attach the 
common “staying probability” to pv and pv; using the newly defined parameters, 
  p sp v v
* =   
                                                                                                                                                             
rate for women who reported being severely abused in their first marriage was 75%. 
17 This argument ignores the two boundary cases (i.e.,  s p v v = 0 and  s p v v =1) and assumes that the strict 
inequalities hold.  
 
18  Figure 2 shows a quadratic that decreases monotonically on the interval [0,1], but the argument does not depend 
on this assumption and is consistent with any quadratic satisfying our end point conditions.  It is not difficult to 
show that G(p) must be decreasing at p = 0 and at the equilibrium p = p*.  It may, however, reach a minimum on the 
interval (p*, 1) and be increasing at p = 1.  
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  p sp v v
* = ,  
 
the model with common divorce rates becomes formally identical to the reparameterized model without 
divorce.  Using the earlier argument, we have an expression for the equilibrium level of violence that is 
analogous to equation (3): 
 












Not surprisingly, divorce prevents the transmission of some violence under our assumptions, and so 
reduces the equilibrium level of violence. 
 
Case 2. Suppose p p p v v = = , so that the probability that a man will be violent is independent of 
whether he grew up in a violent home.  In this case intergenerational transmission takes place only 
through the propensity of women to remain with violent husbands. We can attach the common “violence 
probability” to sv and sv and, rewrite (5b) using the newly defined parameters, 
  s s p v v
* =  
  .s s p v v
* =  
Solving for the equilibrium level of violence yields 







v v 1 ( )
.  
 
Case 3. Suppose sv = 0, so that women who grew up in nonviolent homes will not stay married to 
violent husbands.  In this case, the equilibrium condition (6) reduces to  
 
  p p p p = + -
* * p p v v
2 1 ( ) ,  where p s p v v v
* =  and p s p v v v
* = . 
 
One solution is clearly p =0, the case in which violence disappears.  In fact, this is the only admissible 
solution unless other parameters also assume boundary values.  To see this, notice that if p „0, we can 
divide through by p and the equilibrium condition becomes   
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  1 1 = + -
* * p p v v p p ( ). 
 
That is, a weighted average of pv
*
  and pv
*
  must equal unity.  If p = 1, this implies  pv
* =1, and, hence,  
s p v v = =1  (i.e., men who grew up in violent homes are always violent, and women who grew up in 





equal unity, so that we must have both s p v v = =1, and pv =1 (the additional requirement implies that 
men who grew up in nonviolent homes are always violent.) 
 
  I now relax the assumption that divorce is fully protective for children born into violent families 
and assume instead that divorce is only partially protective.  This may be the case if some violence 
precedes the divorce or if propensities to commit or to tolerate violence are transmitted from parents to 
children by some mechanism other than the actual observation of violence.  More precisely, I assume 
that for a child born into a violent family, divorce is fully protective with probability g and not at all 
protective with probability (1-g).  It is convenient to define a parameter w  to represent the fraction of 
children who possess the propensities characteristic of children who grew up in violent homes. Thus w  
includes both children who grew up in violent homes and children who left violent homes but for whom 
divorce was not protective.  With this convention the equilibrium level of domestic violence, p, will be 
less than the equilibrium level of w ; women who divorce will not themselves be victims of violence, but 
with probability (1-g) their children will carry the same propensities as children who grew up in violent 
homes.
19  Two comments are in order:  (i) Although I have assumed that transmission is based on 
learning and imitation, if the transmission process includes genetic components, then divorce will not be 
fully protective.  (ii) The assumption that divorce is equally protective (or equally unprotective) for boys 
and their propensity to perpetrate violence and for girls and their propensity to tolerate violence is only a 
convenient simplification. 
 
  When divorce is not fully protective, the analogue of equation (5b) is obtained by adding to 
each of the four terms an additional term corresponding to the children who left violent homes but who 
                                                 
19 I continue to assume that divorce protects women from experiencing domestic violence, ignoring the possibility 
that their ex-husbands will pursue them.  Wilson and Daly [1993] present data showing that spousal homicide is more 
female-biased in estranged than in co-residing married couples.  
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have the same propensities to perpetrate and tolerate violence as children who grew up in violent 
homes.  Thus, the analogue of equation (5b) is given by  
 
  (9) 
**2******2
1 (1)(1)(1) tvvtvttvttt vvvv spspspsp wwwwwww + =+-+-+-  






 are given by 
  s s s v v v
** ( )( ) = + - - 1 1 g     and     s s s
v v v
** ( )( ). = + - - 1 1 g  
 
The formal properties of the model are unaffected by relaxing the assumption that divorce is not fully 
protective.  If divorce is not at all protective, then the transmission process is equivalent to that in the 
model with no divorce.  The equilibrium level of violence, however, is not the same in the two models 
because women who divorce are not themselves victims of domestic violence.  The equilibrium level of 
domestic violence can be calculated directly from the equilibrium level ofw : 
 
  (10)  
22 (1)(1)(1) vvvvvvvv spspspsp pwwwwww =+-+-+-  
 
VI.  Assortative Mating 
   
I now relax the assumption that women from violent and nonviolent homes are equally likely to 
marry men who grew up in violent homes and investigate the implications of assortative mating.  A 
positive association between the family backgrounds of husbands and wives, and thus between their 
propensities to commit and to tolerate violence, may result from a correlation between violence 
propensities and other characteristics that affect matching, such as gender role attitudes, or because of 
signals sent and received during courtship.  To generalize the analysis from random mating to assortative 
mating and obtain strong results requires specific functional form assumptions.
20  I consider a particularly 
tractable one-parameter specification of assortative mating.   
 
                                                 
20 A similar situation arises in generalizing the one-sex model of classical stable population theory, which is inherently 
a linear model, to a two-sex model, which is inherently nonlinear.  Strong results in the generalized model require 
specific functional form assumptions; see Pollak [1990].  
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Suppose the marriage market is composed of three distinct submarkets—a “mixed” or 
“combined” submarket that contains both individuals who grew up in violent homes and individuals who 
grew up in nonviolent homes, and two “pure” submarkets, one composed only of individuals who grew 
up in violent homes and the other composed only of individuals who grew up in nonviolent homes.  I 
limit myself to the special case in which the same fraction, ( ) 1-s , of individuals from violent and from 
nonviolent homes enter the combined marriage market.  Within the combined submarket, I assume 
random mating.  We can think of the allocation of individuals to submarkets as a two stage procedure.  
First select an individual at random from the population; with probability p t the individual will be from a 
violent home and with probability 1-p t from a nonviolent home.  Second, assign the randomly selected 
individual to the appropriate pure submarket with probability s and to the combined submarket with 
probability ( ) 1-s .   
 
  Characterizing marriages by the type of home (violent or nonviolent) in which the husband and 
the wife grew up, we distinguish among four types of marriages.  In the two pure submarkets, however, 
only one of the four types is represented, while in the combined submarket all four types are 
represented.  To establish the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the IMDV with divorce and 
assortative mating, we calculate the fraction of violent homes in period t+1:  
 
  (11a)   
p s p s p s p s p p
s p p s p
t v v t v v t v v t v v t t
v v t t v v t
s p s p s p s p
s p s p
+ = + - + - + - -




1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
v ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
 
 
The first two terms represent the contributions of the two pure submarkets; the last four terms, the 
contribution of the combined submarket.  
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  Two polar cases are transparent.  When s = 0, the two pure submarkets disappear and the 
model reduces to the random mating model discussed in section V.  When  s = 1, the mixed or 
combined submarket disappears and the model reduces to “pure assortative mating” – individuals from 
violent homes marry individuals from violent homes, and individuals from nonviolent homes marry 
individuals from nonviolent homes.  With pure assortative mating, equation (10a) becomes  
 
  (11b)  p p p t v v t v v t s p s p + = + - 1 1 ( ) 
 
which is linear in p.  The model with pure assortative mating is isomorphic to the model with random 
mating and no divorce discussed in section IV.  The long-run equilibrium is given by  










where r s p v v v =  and r s p v v v =  and the dynamics are given by an equation analogous to (4).  A diagram 
analogous to figure 1 illustrates the long-run equilibria corresponding to various combinations of rv and 
rv. 
   
  Returning to the general case, we establish the existence of equilibrium as we did in the case of 
random mating, by moving p t+1 to the right hand side of (12a), and replacing p t+1 and p t by the 
equilibrium value, p.  The equilibrium condition becomes  
 
  (13)   
G s p s p s p s p
s p s p
v v v v v v v v
v v v v
( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p s s p s p s p s p p
s p p s p p
= + - + - + - -
+ - - + - - - =
v
v v
1 1 1 1




We observe that, as with random mating,  
 
  G s p v v ( , ) 0 0 s = >   and 
  G s p v v ( , ) . 1 1 0 s = - <    
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The existence of an equilibrium value of p  follows immediately from the continuity of the function 
G(, ) ￿s  and the intermediate value theorem.  To establish uniqueness, we observe that with our one-
parameter specification of assortative mating the function G(, ) ￿s  is quadratic.  Hence, the argument 
from the random mating case applies here as well. 
 
  The greater the degree of assortative mating (i.e., the greater the value of s), the greater the 
equilibrium level of domestic violence.  This comparative statics result follows from the implicit function 
theorem.  Since G( , ) p s =0, we have 
 
  p s = g( ) 
and 






















( , ) . 
The uniqueness argument implies that the function G( , ) p s crosses the x-axis exactly once on the interval 









Thus, the sign of d d p s /  is the same as the sign of ¶ ¶ G( , )/ p s s.  Differentiating G(p,s) with respect 
to s and combining terms we obtain 
 
  (15) 
¶
¶
= - - + -
G







          = - - - ( )( ) ( ) s s p p v v v v p p 1  
 
The first two factors are positive because of our assumptions about intergenerational transmission (e.g., 
men from violent homes are more likely to be violent than men from nonviolent homes); the third and 
fourth factors are positive because p lies between 0 and 1.  Hence  
























  Thus, assortative mating on aspects of family background that are related to individual 
propensities to perpetrate or tolerate violence will increase the equilibrium level of violence. 
 
   
VII.  Conclusion 
 
The IMDV formalizes the commonplace notion of an intergenerational “cycle of domestic 
violence” providing a highly stylized representation of domestic violence and its transmission.  It treats 
intergenerational transmission as stochastic -- witnessing domestic violence in the family of origin is not 
an inexorable precursor of violence, but it does increase the likelihood of violence.  The motivation for 
violence is purely expressive and not at all instrumental: violence and threats of violence are not 
manifestations of power used to enforce allocational or distributional outcomes.  The IMDV is thus 
consistent with the “culture of violence” analysis emphasized by Straus and Gelles [1995].  
 
The IMDV is less consistent with recent bargaining models of marriage, including those 
developed in Lundberg and Pollak [1993, 1994, 1996].  Lundberg and Pollak [1993] develops a 
cooperative model with an internal (noncooperative) threat point and suggests that incorporating 
domestic violence into this type of bargaining model could shed light on both distribution within marriage 
and the incidence of domestic violence.  But incorporating domestic violence into a bargaining model of 
marriage is difficult for much the same reasons that incorporating strikes into models of union-firm 
bargaining is difficult: in the absence of mistakes or private information, neither domestic violence nor 
strikes will occur in equilibrium.
21 
  
  21  
Although the IMDV is not a rational choice model, it could easily be modified to allow 
maximizing behavior at the key decision points—marriage, fertility, divorce, and violence—while 
maintaining the emphasis on intergenerational linkages.  Economic factors, policy variables, and social 
and cultural factors might influence domestic violence through the probabilities that are the parameters of 
the model.  For example, economic factors such as earnings and the availability of welfare benefits might 
influence domestic violence primarily through their effect on marriage and divorce probabilities.
22  The 
model may thus cast some light on the effect on domestic violence of welfare reform policies that create 
incentives to keep marriages together because such policies are likely to increase the probability that 
violent as well as nonviolent marriages remain intact.  Policy variables, such as the way police respond 
to domestic violence complaints and the way courts treat domestic violence cases, might influence 
domestic violence primarily through their direct effect on violence probabilities.  The social and cultural 
acceptability of violence might also influence violence probabilities and probabilities of divorce in the 
event of violence. 
 
  The IMDV calls attention to three features neglected in the domestic violence literature.  The 
first is the marriage market.  If some men are more likely than others to be violent as husbands and 
some women are more likely than others to remain in violent marriages, then the probability that such 
individuals marry each other is crucial.  Furthermore, to the extent that these assortative mating results 
generalize to more complex specifications, the equilibrium level of domestic violence increases 
monotonically with assortative mating on the basis of violence or on characteristics related to violence in 
families of origin.  The second neglected feature is divorce: ongoing domestic violence requires the 
conjunction of a husband who is violent and a wife who stays.  Appropriate measures of the prevalence 
and correlates of domestic violence depend on whether the population at risk is defined as couples who 
entered marriage at a particular date or as married couples at a particular date.
23  Hence, recognition of 
the importance of the marriage market and divorce is crucial to calculating such measures.  Third, 
variables and policies that reduce the rate of domestic violence in the short run are likely to reduce it 
even further in the long run.  Amplification of the impact effect follows from the dynamics of 
intergenerational transmission: a permanent change in an economic or policy variable that reduces the 
                                                                                                                                                             
21 Kennan [1986] and Cramton and Tracy [1992] discuss strikes. 
22 It would be more difficult to generalize the model to include an intergenerational transmission mechanism for 
earnings, and to allow earnings or earnings prospects to play a role in the marriage market. 
23 Similar analytic issues arise in thinking about the correlates of welfare or unemployment;  the population entering  
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rate of violence in period t reduces it even further in period t+1 and beyond because it reduces the 
fraction of individuals who grew up in violent families. 
                                                                                                                                                             
welfare at a particular date looks very different from the population of welfare recipients.  
  23  
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Appendix:  A Necessary but Uninformative Quadratic 
 
  It is convenient to write the function G(p) in a form sufficiently general to accommodate 
assortative mating as well as divorce: 
 
 
G A B C D E ( ) ( ) ( ) p p p p p p = + - + - + +









  a = A – B + C 
 
  b = B – 2C + D 
 
  c = C + E. 
 
From the quadratic formula: 
 
  p*=






The existence argument implies that  b ac
2 4 0 - ‡  so that the quadratic has real roots.  The uniqueness 
argument implies that if the roots are distinct, one and only one of them lies in the interval [0, 1]. 
 
In the absence of assortative mating, D = -1 and E = 0, so 
 
  a A B C s p s p s p s p v v v v v v v v = - + = - - +  
 
  b B C s p s p s p v v v v v v = - - = + - - 2 1 2 1 
 
  c C s p v v = = . 
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Fig. 1 -- Long-Run Equilibrium. 
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Fig. 2 -- Existence and Uniqueness of Long-Run Equilibrium. 
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